The Seven Years' War
From the book
In the autumn of 1757, the British forces besieging the fortress of Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island withdrew without having taken it. The campaign had been badly managed, the weather had been foul, and the French garrison had held. The failure stung a government that had been promising the public a war conducted with energy and decisiveness, and it fell to William Pitt, the minister who had effectively taken charge of British strategy, to explain why an island fortress that Britain's navy ought to have been able to reduce had been left standing. Pitt's explanation was characteristically blunt: the operation had been planned without adequate knowledge of the approaches, the harbour, or the coastal waters through which any assault would have to pass. The charts were wrong. The soundings were incomplete. Men had been asked to fight a battle that their commanders could not see clearly enough to direct.
More chapters in this book
- A World Waiting to Be Measured
- The Boy from Yorkshire
- Whitby and the Coal Ships
- Choosing the Navy
- The Surveyor of Newfoundland
- Elizabeth and the Life Left Ashore
This is the opening of the chapter. The full chapter, and all 40 chapters, are in James Cook.